The study proposes a three stage model of the development of business incubation practices in emerging markets. The model addresses the diffusion of incubation practices to new markets, the institutionalization of those practices and the co-evolution of incubators and national networks of incubation. The model is based on interviews conducted in Bolivia, Peru, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil. New incubators in emerging markets often face strong cultural norms and institutional impediments to helping entrepreneurs start new businesses. As incubation becomes better established in a country, incubators provide more advanced technical, legal and market-based advice. Networks of incubators form to share specialized services across many incubators, to allocate government funding to incubators, and to lobby for public and private support of innovation.
Introduction
Business incubation encourages new business formation and offers the potential to improve emerging market economies by improving survival rates and growth of new businesses. A business incubator is defined as "A business incubator is a shared office space facility that seeks to provide its incubatees with a strategic or valueadding intervention system of monitoring and business assistance." (Hackett and Dilts, 2004, p. 57) . Incubators originated as a means to recycle surplus buildings into new businesses in order to improve economic development (Hackett and Dilts, 2004) . Incubators improve entrepreneurs access to services, decrease the start-up costs for new firms, and improve their access to markets (iDisc, 2003) . Worldwide, there are over 4,000 incubators (Hackett and Dilts, 2004) .
Although business incubation practices originated in developed economies, incubation is now practiced in many emerging markets. Cultural and political conditions cause variation in the incubation infrastructure and focus. By understanding the development of incubators in emerging markets, incubator managers, policy makers and entrepreneurs can better anticipate the forces that will shape their development efforts.
I propose a three stage model for the development of business incubation practices in emerging markets. A key feature of the model is the co-evolution of the incubators' capabilities and the creation and elaboration of national networks of incubation. The five countries studied (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Peru) have created business incubators to encourage and advise entrepreneurs how to start new businesses and to improve the likelihood that these businesses will survive. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), universities, government economic development agencies and private foundations encourage incubator formation by providing know-how, managerial talent, advising and financial support.
New incubators in emerging markets often face strong cultural norms that impede entrepreneurs from starting businesses. They also face structural impediments from institutions operating in the economy. Incubators provide technical, legal and market-based advice. Incubators assist entrepreneurs to establish relationships with suppliers and customers through contacts through the incubator's organizational networks. Basic business incubation practices are common across almost all incubators but specialized practices (intellectual property protection, engineering design) are unique to specific incubators. The development of incubator networks varies significantly across the five countries studied.
Most incubators in this study offered their clients space for rent, access to trained business counselors, and assistance with funding, all at below market prices (ChileHG, 2006; ChileNorth, 2006; PeruIM, 2006; ArgentinaCity, 2006; iDisc, 2003) . Some incubators were too new to have space available but were planning to offer space in the future (Bolivia, 2006; ArgentinaCity, 2006) or were operating as virtual incubators (ChileAI, 2006) .
Data and Methodology
The focus of this study was to understand the nature of business incubation activities in a portion of South America. To plan the study, I first attended the CLADEA (Consejo Latinoamericano de Escuelas de Administración) conference of business schools in Santiago, Chile in October of 2005. I conducted exploratory interviews during visits to two incubators at Chilean universities (one public and one private university), and an interview with a venture capital network manager. I was invited to attend the official formation of the ChileIncuba incubator network, and afterwards met with a founder of Santiago's first incubator who was now an official in CORFO, the Chilean government's economic development agency.
The countries selected for the study vary in economic, social and cultural conditions related to business incubation, and in the extent and sophistication of incubation activity. In June, July and August of 2006, I interviewed managers from business incubators, government agencies, non-governmental organizations and entrepreneurship educators in the five countries. Incubators in each country were selected where possible to give a variety of types, locations, sizes, and age (ranging from just founded to very experienced). I also interviewed officials involved in key government incubation financing agencies (CORFO in Chile, SEBRAE and ANPROTEC in Brazil). These agencies were particularly helpful in understanding the development of national networks of incubation.
Interviews were usually 1.5 to 2 hours long and followed a series of prompts in an emergent style consistent with qualitative research procedures used to develop theory from case data (Eisenhardt, 1989). The managers interviewed were able to direct the conversation into areas that they felt were most important or productive. Important issues raised in earlier interviews were often raised in subsequent interviews to see if experiences and views differed.
Interviews were conducted primarily in English, with some in Spanish and to a lesser extent in Portuguese. I provided simultaneous translation of Spanish and Portuguese responses when needed. To confirm translation accuracy, a former business professor from Chile reviewed and transcribed several interviews with significant amounts of Spanish. 
The Model
I propose that incubation systems in emerging markets evolved in stages driven by their clients' needs for services and the choices of their governments for economic development. Nelson and Winter (1982) identified routines as the key to how economies evolve. In the context of business incubation systems, pioneering incubators were founded using routines imported from foreign NGOs. Using established routines from organizations with incubation experience served to give these nascent incubators legitimacy and helped overcome initial skepticism by local sponsors (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983 ) and over time the incubators adapted those routines to serve local entrepreneurs. (Griliches, 1957; Rogers, 1995) . Economic advantage is difficult to show for pioneering-stage incubators given that it may take over two years for the first incubatee firm to enter the marketplace.
According to institutional theory (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983; March, 1981 ) one way to gain legitimacy is to copy the routines of stakeholders or leading organizations in the society. Another key to legitimacy is to be effective in achieving valued outcomes. The new incubators used proven incubation techniques imported from experienced development agencies to provide effective incubation. Change agents like infodev provided a track record in other countries that incubation was an appropriate technology for emerging markets.
Managers of pioneering incubators emphasized that successful incubation began with the recruiting of clients that are willing to learn, can take direction, and have a business idea with some competitive advantage (PeruIM, 2006; ChileAN, 2006; ChileAI, 2006; ArgentinaDES, 2006) . Pioneering incubators worked hard at avoiding failures and creating successes so that the incubator justified being funded (Bolivia, 2006; PeruIM, 2006; ChileNorth; . For this reason, pioneering incubators copied the most effective incubation routines used by more experienced incubators and NGOs (e. g. using business plan contests to attract potential incubatees).
Focus on overcoming cultural biases regarding entrepreneurs. Cultural attitudes affect entrepreneurs' willingness to incubate and the image of entrepreneurs in society. How entrepreneurship is viewed in a society is an important issue for pioneering incubators. According to Rogers (1995 Incubator managers referred to the owners of these micro-businesses as "entrepreneurs of necessity" because the created their businesses to survive an economy that had high unemployment. Entrepreneurs' of necessity were regarded as mixed blessings because they only employed one person, were often "unofficial" (unregistered so they paid no taxes) but they did help reduce poverty. The net effect of these cultural conditions was that entrepreneurs lowered their aspiration levels, resisted growing beyond soleproprietorships, and avoided "official" agencies like incubators.
Unfortunately, micro-businesses also competed with the pioneer incubators for government financing and consumed the incubators' scarce counseling resources. One incubator consultant noted that by helping unregistered micro-entrepreneurs who had no desire to grow or to become official, he was using government resources to help entrepreneurs of necessity avoid paying taxes, thereby jeopardizing the incubator's reputation (PeruPRV, 2006) . However, to ignore these entrepreneurs risked alienating the public against the university and the incubator. To avoid this, incubators put on public education programs for the city government that helped train all entrepreneurs (PeruPRV, 2006) .
Confronted by the difficulty of overcoming anti-owner biases and low aspiration levels, two managers from pioneering incubators expressed almost missionary-like determination to help entrepreneurs succeed: Bolivia, 2006) . For example, the Bolivian incubation and economic development experts had discussed the potential formation of a network in the future but it seemed to be a secondary concern given the immediate challenges of starting their incubator (Bolivia, 2006) . However, as incubation gained more structure and was seen as more legitimate, it attracted more entrepreneurs and more sponsorship from government and other agencies (CORFO, 2005) . Pioneering incubators in countries that do not have networked incubator systems lose the benefit from the learning that can occur from knowledge spillovers (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990 ) as experiences and ideas flow across incubators. Capturing knowledge spillovers is one reason incubators co-locate their firms, so that the clients can interact and build synergies across clients. A network can capture these same synergies and export them to many incubators but if there is no network those experiences do not diffuse throughout the national incubation system.
In the pioneering stage, incubators begin planning how to form networks. For example, Peru could have copied Chile's network structure. Peruvian faculty and incubator managers interviewed said that they admired Chile's network which had been formed in October, 2005. However, both Peruvian and Bolivian incubator managers would not solicit technical assistance from Chile due to the concern that their governments would punish them. Their fear stemmed from recurring border disputes with Chile resulting from a war fought with Chile in the previous century. Instead, pioneering stage incubators in Peru and Bolivia relied on learning from international NGOs such as infodev as well as Colombian and Brazilian incubators.
Argentina was a different case. Incubators had significant funding partly as a political response to the unemployment caused by the devaluation of its currency several years earlier (ArgentinaDES, 2006). Formal networks were not initiated due in part to rivalries between the national, state, and city of Buenos Aires governments. In spite of the complex environment, the need to coordinate activities and the driving spirit of incubation managers and economic development professionals led to an emergent and informal grassroots economic development and incubation movement. The group had begun to meet periodically several months before my interviews. The group was formalizing their meetings and planning to become an official trade group that would serve as a nucleus to help guide government development policy (ArgentinaUniv, 2006).
Operating Stage
During this stage, the incubator builds on its track record of helping entrepreneurs and selects entrepreneurs with higher ambitions. Although some pre-incubation activities are always needed, operating stage incubators focus on helping clients form strong venture management teams (ChileAI, 2006), improving their products, and finding funding for expanded operations. As their resource commitment to the incubatee grows, incubators introduce performance measures to hold clients accountable. Below I explain the operating stage activities of incubators observed in this study. Screening resulted in more ambitious ventures that needed more resources to reach commercialization and thereby creating higher demand funding for incubatees. Once incubation has demonstrated success, governments desire to magnify the incubators' benefits to the economy and introduce programs to fund the early operation of the business. Emerging markets are often short of venture capital and investors are unwilling to take risks on unknown entrepreneurs. The incubator and its sponsors use their reputations and relationships to advance their incubatees. Government development agencies introduce funding programs. For example, CORFO developed a clever risk-sharing program for seed capital that mixed private and public funds for prototyping and early commercialization. Incubators received funding to help pay for consulting services but had to screen applicants for strong growth potential.
In the operating stage, incubators had more at stake with each client so they developed improved screening methods and criteria. A strong selection process improved the chances that the venture would be competitive. A university incubator with a technology focus described their selection routine below:
"…so now they are looking for projects that they can transform into a business. That's the key…they are looking at the whole process of tech transfer as they find these ideas that they want to transform into businesses, often they find them with their internal research people and they develop them into formal businesses."
Measures of incubator and incubatee success. Operational incubators develop capabilities that address the key issues of their incubatee firms and their sponsors. As the firms at this level are screened more vigorously for competitive advantage and growth potential, the incubators have to provide more assistance with funding, production, marketing and intellectual property protection. Funders' expectations will lead to the development of measures of incubator performance.
Key outcomes for pioneering incubators included the number of firms in pre-incubation, the number of business plans completed, and applications submitted to sponsors for start-up funding (ChileNorth, 2006) . In the operating stage the incubatee is to have gone beyond a prototype to selling on a regular basis and generating funds to help pay for some incubation services. An operating stage incubator manager described two key measures he used to judge incubator success:
"one is number of companies [graduated from the incubator]; another one is have we been at least even with our resources? We did not lose, or giving more money, we're even."
Operating stage incubators did not have the "antientrepreneur" cultural issues that pioneering incubators confronted. However, lack of bankruptcy laws and the heavy social stigma of declaring bankruptcy increasingly impacted operating stage incubators in their dealings with potential incubatees. Incubators worked actively to avoid or prevent bankruptcy by screening ventures and owners more closely and using higher metrics for expected revenues in deciding which firms to incubate. Bankrupt clients hurt the incubator's reputation as well as that of its sponsors (ArgentinaUniv, 2006) . Entrepreneurs invested significant personal resources into the startups and worried that they might go bankrupt which could limit their future career prospects. For example, consider this response to the question: Is there a bankruptcy procedure? In the operating stage, incubation networks are negotiated and formed. ChileIncuba's formation was a good example, originating after a period of independent incubation. Chile's incubators wanted to band together to negotiate with the government for better venture funding and to share resources (CORFO, 2005) (ChileHG, 2006). Some incubators in the system had advanced capabilities and could bring considerable knowledge to the other incubators. However, there was still an atmosphere of rivalry and competition among the incubator members making performance measures a potential future problem 
Advanced Stage
Advanced stage incubators engage more intensely and more often in a number of issues that are noticeably different than confronted in earlier stages. The capabilities of advanced incubators must serve clients that are technically sophisticated and have growth potential. Development of capabilities was a function of both individual incubator goals and skills as well as the co-evolution of the capabilities in the incubator network and government support systems for investment (Nelson, 1993 ).
In the advanced stage, incubators are still focused on finding firms to incubate however the expectations of the firm and the entrepreneur by the incubator are more demanding. Eligible firms must pass significant hurdles in terms of having a clear competitive advantage, potential for securing intellectual property protection, willingness to form a strong venture team, and eligibility to obtain initial capital investment often through an incubator network administered funding initiative. One incubator manager described it this way: A number of advanced incubators took equity positions in exchange for their incubation services. Advanced incubators with equity stakes in ventures were effectively managing an investment portfolio of formerly incubated companies. This was a choice made by the entrepreneur and the incubator in part to ensure a continuing relationship with the incubator after the firm graduates to independence (ChileDCT, 2006; BrazilBIO, 2006; ChileAI, 2006 Advanced incubators usually had incubated more firms and larger firms. Their staff were also more specialized in order to provide more sophisticated services and to manage their government and incubator network relationships (usually done by the incubator manager in operating incubators). Finding investment capital and managing government grants demanded much more effort than during the operating stage. One incubator manager described their staffing as follows:
"Incubation is [Name]who takes the lead in the typical work of incubation: legal support, managing the process of incubation and investment. I take the lead in finance investment, it's when they need some private fundings. What we try to do is to find a strategy to create the biggest company as possible before involving outside investors or angel networks."
Specialization of incubators. In advanced systems, specialized incubators emerge to serve a particular industry, technology, sponsoring organization or delivery of a particular service. For example, an incubator in Brazil focused exclusively on biotechnology, another focused on innovations in the advanced electronics industry and yet another focused on faculty innovations from a large university. In one software incubator, 80% of its clients were faculty and students from its sponsoring university (BrazilSoft1, 2006). Further specialization in incubation occurred when the government created funding for "social" incubators targeted to alleviate poverty in marginalized populations through formation of cooperatives and collectives (Etzkowitz, et al., 2006; BrazilAN, 2006; BrazilCMPSOC, 2006 Advanced stage incubator network capabilities. In the advanced stage, incubators are facing higher demands from their more sophisticated incubatees and must either develop capabilities or find them elsewhere. Networks institutionalize collaboration between incubators by establishing who will specialize and how they will be compensated. An increased demand for funding has the network coordinating the development of new funding initiatives, and negotiating with government agencies and international funders (BrazilSEB, 2006) . Finally, the networks face increased scrutiny from their regulators resulting in development of performance measures. These measures encourage incubator efficiency and effectiveness. The network uses its coercive strength (ability to withhold resources) to impose these measures on the incubators. Below are my observations of advanced stage networks:
Networks allow for the new incubators to benefit from the recycling of knowledge from the pioneering incubators in the form of routines, technology, and processes (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Teece, 1986) . In general, transfer of knowledge can occur through indirect observation of spillovers (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) , the movement of employees (Robinson and Miner, 1996) , or imitation of practices of other organizations (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983 ). In the advanced stage knowledge flows in part through the systematic transfer of personnel for temporary or permanent assignments, including service to the network itself in centralized networks (BrazilSEB, 2006) . In one Brazilian network, incubator managers were required to move to different incubators every three years (assuming the manager effective enough to be wanted by another incubator) (BrazilNetwork, 2006; BrazilMG, 2006 Introduction of performance measures at the network level. Resistance to network formation can be significant. The incubator fears losing control to the network managers. Incubator performance evaluations by the network began as a way to spread best practices and establish milestones for incubatee and incubator performance (BrazilNetwork, 2006) . These performance measures diffused by having respected incubator managers develop and promote (Rogers, 1995) the new measures at annual incubation conferences (BrazilCMP, 2006) . For example, the Brazilian network counted the number of incubatees and graduated firms in its performance measures. Some incubators objected to these measures because they did not value quality (high growth ventures with large sales) but instead valued quantity (small low growth businesses). The measures were changed (BrazilNetwork, 2006; BrazilANP, 2006) By linking funding to incubator performance on these measures, the networks effectively coerced incubators to mimic network policies (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983) . Network managers predicted that resistance to evaluations would fade as the incubators began to take them for granted (March, 1981) .
Brazil required reporting of performance indicators (e.g. incubatee gross sales receipts, tax revenue from those sales, and the number of jobs created by incubatees) and used incentives to reward strong performance (BrazilCIE, 2006) . Regional and national networks used performance data to show that their incubators were returning value-added for their countries. Comparability of performance across networks increased pressures to clone the best performing incubators and trim the worst to save costs. Not surprisingly, incubator managers welcomed the use of indicators if their incubator performed well but feared them if the incubator was a "poor" performer (BrazilSOC, 2006; BrazilNetwork, 2006) .
Conclusion
Business incubation practices in emerging market nations vary in the extent of their diffusion as well as the variety of incubators that are operating in each country. By performing interviews in several countries that had differing levels of incubation capabilities I was able to see the differences and similarities across incubators as well as the national networks of business incubation that were forming or had formed in those countries.
The study proposes an empirical model that integrates observed business incubation practices with diffusion of innovation, organizational learning and institutional theories. The model addresses the specific stages of evolutionary development of the diffusion of business incubation and the development of national incubation networks. The stages are illustrated with examples of relevant practices or conditions from each of the five countries, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Peru. Table 3 Table 3 . Network descriptions by country
The results of this study indicate that there is a progression for the development of incubation practices in emerging markets, but it is a varied and complex progression. Cultural factors influence the acceptance of incubation by potential entrepreneurs. Early specialization by certain incubators shapes the incubation networks' capabilities to assist entrepreneurs. As networks develop, incubators must demonstrate their ability to graduate successful firms into the market.
Incubation networks evolve from the "bottom-up" to serve the needs of the incubators. As the network matures and the incubators need more resources to provide their clients extensive financial and technical support, the national government provides added funding and partnerships with venture capital providers emerge. In turn, government sponsors and investors demand more accountability and demonstrable economic development outcomes such as increased employment, tax revenues, etc. Because of their increasing investment (both financial and political) in incubator success, the government exerts stronger influence over the incubator network and the network becomes a more top-down regulator of incubator activity.
